The role of government in safety policy for airpotrs since the attacks Essay

The role of government in safety policy for airpotrs since the attacks of september 11,2001 - Essay Example s well as people in buildings and on the ground are to be protected, terrorists of aviation must be prevented from passing through security checkpoints and gaining access to aircraft. Before September 2001, U.S. General Accounting Office’s (GAO) involvement in aviation security was to oversee the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) which had responsibility for aircraft safety, all under the auspices of the Department of Transportation (DOT). Studies conducted by the GAO had consistently demonstrated that there were major weaknesses in aviation security and this had been a problem for a long time. Among the most important aspect of these weaknesses involved airport screening. The industry was not required to screen checked baggage on domestic flights and proved inadequate in the detection of threats when carry-on bags or screening passengers prior to their boarding aircraft. It also provided insufficient security for air traffic control computer systems and inadequate means for restricting access to secure areas at airports and facilities. The Congress and the administration have reorganized the federal agencies responsible for transportation security, tr ansferring them to the new Department of Homeland Security, and the agencies are attempting to enhance security without unduly inhibiting the movement of goods and people. The Transportation Security Administration, which was created in November 2001 and has assumed overall responsibility for transportation security, has made considerable progress in addressing aviation security challenges. Prior to 9/11, airline screeners were hired by the airlines or airports directly. They frequently did not detect terrorist material located either on the passengers or in their carry-on baggage. According to a GAO report in June 2000, a study of screeners conducted in 1987 discovered that airport screeners failed to observe 20 percent of the potentially hazardous items that the FAA used in its tests. Data collected